In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. e same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to reformulate all these theories in terms of lower bounds on partial preorders, conceived of as maximal antichains, and I show that treating lower bounds as cutsets does strictly better at capturing our intuitions about the semantics of modals, counterfactuals, and deontic conditionals. For any world of evaluation i, the ordering of worlds ≲ i relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual 'A > C ' makes any two worlds that are ≲ i -comparable to i also ≲ i -comparable to each other.
I am compelled by Kratzer's hypothesis that although different uses of a given modal can be used to target different avors of modality, "there is something in the meaning [of that modal] … which stays invariable" (, ) . It is because I endorse this hypothesis that I read ≲ i and < i as 'is at least as good as' and 'is better than': I think it is helpful to characterize the preorders relevant to different modal avors as generally as possible. e qualitative terms 'good' and 'better' are apt descriptions of all sorts of preorders, including those relevant to counterfactuals, epistemic modals, and (most naturally) deontic and bouletic modals. ose who prefer more familiar talk of 'closeness' and 'resemblance' for counterfactuals may read 'is better than' as 'more closely resembles the world of evaluation. ' But it is easy to be misled by 'close, ' ≲ is conditionally re exive iff ∀x(∃y(x ≲ y ∨ y ≲ x) → x ≲ x). Preorders are usually de ned as re exive and transitive relations; I am loosening the de nition slightly to allow for the possibility that the relevant preorder takes no stand whatsoever on some accessible worlds.
For epistemic modals one may read 'is better than' as 're ects more information, ' where the amount of information is measured by strict set inclusion. ' closer, ' 'nearby, ' and other spatial metaphors into imputing too much structure to a preorder, assuming perhaps that it has properties of a metric space-for example, that it is total, or that there is an ideal that is a nite 'distance' away from any point. ' At least as good as' and 'is better than' are quite helpful in this respect: it is not counterintuitive to think that two situations might each be better than a third and yet incomparable to each other, or to think that one situation might be better than another but not better 'by' any quanti able factor or amount. Moreover, it may be that in philosophers' discussions of counterfactuals metaphors of distance have become counterproductively intertwined with questions about the logic and semantics of counterfactuals. Even if Lewis is wrong about which preorders are relevant to the evaluation of counterfactuals (see, e.g., H ), ordering semantics might still be the right semantics for counterfactuals. Abandoning distance metaphors helps underscore this point.
'≲' and '<' are subscripted with 'i' to index them to the world of evaluation. According to standard versions of ordering semantics for modals, to say how things might be, for all we know, is to make claims about how things are at possible worlds consistent with what we know. As a result, which preorders matter to the evaluation of a given sentence sometimes depends on how things would have been if things had been different. For example, on standard ordering semantics for 'might' and 'is permissible, ' the claim that () It might be that lying is permissible.
entails that some world w consistent with what is known makes lying permissible according to the deontic preorder at w. But a speaker who asserts () may take no stand on whether w is the actual world. For () to be true there must be some epistemically accessible world w such that lying is permissible according to ≲ w ; whether it is the actual world is immaterial.
. 'Must' and 'permissible'
Kratzer informally glosses her semantics for modals as saying "that a proposition is a necessity if and only if it is true in all accessible worlds which come closest to the ideal established by the ordering source" (, ). But her official semantics is a bit more complicated than this leads one to expect.
PM (P 'M'):
'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) iff for every world h ∈ S ≲i there is some world j such that j ≲ i h and every world k such that k ≲ i j is a C-world. (,  ; , )⁴ Two issues prompt the complications. First, Kratzer allows for preorders on which, for some A, for every A-world there is a better one. (In short, she does not endorse any analogues of the limit assumption.) Second, she wants to allow for preorders that are merely partial. e cases I use here to raise problems for Kratzer exploit these complications: they involve merely partial preorders on which an analogue of the limit assumption fails. e status of the limit assumption and the importance of partiality are both controversial. But the controversy centers on the properties of the actual deontic ordering. For example, when Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane defend the limit assumption for deontic modals, they write that it "is a safe assumption if (a) there can be only nitely many agents, (b) each agent can have only nitely many possible choices, and (c) no two worlds where agents make the same choices differ in respect of deontic ideality" (, ). Whether or not these considerations establish anything about the properties of the actual deontic preorder, they are irrelevant to deontic modals embedded in constructions that shi the preorder. For example, I am not certain that there are nitely many agents facing only nitely many possible choices. Indeed, for all I know there are in nitely many agents facing in nitely many choices. So some preorders relevant to the evaluation of 'I must keep my promise' in () are in nite, even if the actual one is not.
()
For all I know I must keep my promise.
Similarly for totality: as a matter of fact I suspect that the deontic preorder is partial. Whether or not I am right about this, however, I cannot imagine being certain that it is total. So for all I know the actual deontic preorder is merely partial. So even if the actual deontic preorder is total, some preorders relevant to evaluating 'I must keep my promise' in () will not be. Our semantics for 'must' and other modals should not be tailored to features of the actual deontic preorder. In light of our ignorance about the features of the actual deontic preorder, our semantics should not presuppose the limit assumption or any analogue of it, and should allow for merely partial preorders. For brevity I will not go through the circumlocutions necessary to guarantee the semantic relevance of merely partial preorders that violate the limit assumption. Instead I will describe cases that, intuitively, call for such preorders in the characterization of a particular believer's deontic ordering, and I will tacitly assume that the believer is right about the deontic ordering. is last assumption is convenient ⁴I assume that the prejacents of modals and the antecedents and consequents of conditionals express propositions conceived of as sets of possible worlds, and I distinguish typographically between clauses (A, B, C, …) and the propositions they express (A, B, C,…).
but inessential: the reader is welcome to drop the assumption and instead embed sentences under, e.g., "Given the truth of X's beliefs about the deontic ordering" if it makes judgments easier to get. Moreover, the particular examples I will discuss are far less important than the principles they illustrate, so I invite the substitution of other illustrations of those principles wherever it is helpful.
Suppose that John and Karen deontically value proper supersets of children strictly increasingly, and that, because they think every life is uniquely precious, they think that sets of children neither of which is a subset of the other are deontically incomparable. ey are able to choose to conceive exactly one of two potential children, Alice and Bert. is kind of situation calls for a preorder like that in P :
w 1 is a C-world, and w 2 and i are ¬C-worlds. 
P 
Let C be the proposition that Alice is conceived and Bert is not. Now consider the following semantics for 'must, ' which is simpler than PM:
According to TM, 'Must C ' is true at i because w 1 ∈ S ≲i and for all worlds k in S ≲i if k ≲ i w 1 then k is a C-world. And 'Must not C ' is true at i because w 2 ∈ S ≲i and for all worlds k in S ≲i if k ≲ i w 2 then k is a ¬C-world. Given that we model John and Karen's situation with a preorder like the one described in P , according to TM all of ()-() are true at i.
() It must be that Alice is not conceived.
() It must be that Alice is conceived.
 ()
It must be that Bert is not conceived.
() It must be that Bert is conceived.
is is an unacceptable result. Intuitively, a conception is morally obligatory, contra () and (). And it needn't be that Alice in particular is conceived, or that Bert in particular is conceived (contra () and ()), although every way of improving on i involves conceiving Alice or Bert. So TM is not an adequate semantics for 'must' in these cases. More generally, TM is not an adequate semantics for 'must' in cases that must be modeled with a merely partial preorder. I say this not to disparage TM-it was never intended to handle merely partial preorders-but only to show why the more complicated PM was proposed in the rst place. In contrast to TM, PM predicts that 'Must C ' will be false at i given a model like P . is is because for h = w 2 , there is no world j such that (i) j ≲ i h and (ii) every world k such that k ≲ i j is a C-world. Similarly for 'Must not C ' and h = w 1 . None of ()-() come out true at i according to PM. ese are the intuitively correct predictions. Moreover, given that 'it must be that' and 'it is permissible that' are duals, all of ()-() are true at i according to PM.
It is permissible that Alice is conceived.
() It is permissible that Alice is not conceived.
() It is permissible that Bert is conceived.
() It is permissible that Bert is not conceived.
() It must be that Alice or Bert is conceived.
Again these predictions are right. Every way of improving on i involves conceiving Alice or Bert, and so it must be that Alice or Bert is conceived. Because Kratzer developed PM to make the right predictions for modals evaluated relative to partial preorders, I call it an example of partial preorder semantics for modals. Note that Kratzer's semantics for 'Must C ' requires only that for each world h ∈ S ≲i there be some world j such that j ≲ i h and every world k at least as good as j is a Cworld. It's not easy for there to be, for each such world h, some world j satisfying both these conditions. So Kratzer's semantics is fairly strong. But it is not strong enough. For 'Must C ' may be true at i according to PM even though i can be improved on without limit without making C true.
Here is an example. Add to what we already know about John and Karen that they have an unusual condition: they will have only boys unless they have an operation that will allow them to conceive one girl but will also make them infertile. ey still deontically value nite proper supersets of children strictly increasingly but they  believe they must have at most nitely many children. is deontic structure is represented in the gure below, labeled 'C   .' e numbers indicate which children are conceived: boys have even numbers and girls have odd numbers. It must be that a girl is conceived.
() It must be that the last child conceived is a girl.
() It is permissible that only boys are conceived.
() It must be that only boys are conceived.
e truth of () and () is very counterintuitive. According to the preorder, given that n children will be conceived it is not better for child 2n − 1 to be conceived, or to be conceived last, than it is for child 2n to be conceived. e falsity of () is very counterintuitive for analogous reasons. And the difference between () and () is also counterintuitive: given the features of the preorder, girls do not have a special status that boys lack. Note also that the truth of () actually does not depend on the gender of even numbered children: it stays true even if if we omit that detail. Finally, note that (given Kratzer's views on conditionals) for any natural number n, () is true:
⁵It is worth noting that supervaluating over the partial preorder in the way prescribed by S , - and , - and - (and endorsed by L  and W , among others) yields the correct results about this case: (), (), and () all are false at i, and () is true at i. Stalnaker's approach gives the wrong results about other cases, however; see my .
 ()
If John and Karen were obligated to conceive at most n children, they wouldn't have to conceive a girl.
e antecedent of () 'lops off ' the top of the tree depicted in C   , so that for some world h ∈ S ≲i (namely, the best remaining solely evennumbered world) there is some world j such that j ≲ i h (namely, h itself) and every world k at least as good as j is a world in which only boys are conceived. But the simultaneous truth of () and all the instances of () is very counterintuitive.
We need to re ne partial preorder semantics. Some terminology will be helpful.
De nition . A set S is a ≲ chain iff ≲ totally preorders S.
Although a chain is standardly understood to be a set with a total order (i.e., a set with an antisymmetric total preorder), here I allow chains and other standard order theoretic objects to be sets with mere preorders.
De nition . A ≲ chain S is a maximal ≲ chain iff no ≲ chain properly includes S.
A straightforward adaptation of the Hausdorff maximality theorem⁶ to preorders guarantees that every ≲ chain is a subset of some maximal ≲ chain:
Proposition . For any partially preordered set S and any totally preordered subset of S, S ′ , there is a maximal totally preordered set S
In other words, any ≲ chain can be 'extended' into a maximal ≲ chain. For example, in C   , the chain that has as elements the world in which exactly child 2 is conceived and the world in which exactly children 2 and 4 are conceived can be extended into in nitely many different maximal chains. One such maximal chain has as elements the world in which exactly child 2 is conceived, the world in which exactly children 2 and 4 are conceived, and the world in which exactly children 2, 4, and 5 are conceived. (Another maximal chain terminates in the conception of child 7, another in the conception of child 9, and so on.) But another such maximal chain has as elements the worlds in which John and Karen conceive only boys. Kratzer's semantics in effect disregards this maximal chain; it simply isn't relevant. All that Kratzer's semantics cares about in C    and in similar cases is the fact that for each world in the modal base, there is some world that is at least as good in which John and Karen conceive a girl, with no better worlds than that one in which they do not conceive a girl. Lewis's familiar metaphor of nested spheres centered on the world of evaluation (, -) provides a helpful way to think of modals and counterfactuals when they are evaluated with respect to total preorders. No similarly helpful metaphor ⁶H , -. For an excellent presentation see K , -. has been given for partial preorders. But it is possible to think of a partially preordered set S as being partitioned into an 'upper subset' containing all the elements that are at least as highly ranked as some element in a given 'lower bound, ' and a 'lower subset' containing the remaining elements of S. Reformulating PM in these terms helps bring out how certain relationships between a partial preorder and its maximal chains-relationships exempli ed by C   -can make trouble for PM. Moreover, this reformulation makes it easier to see how to treat cases like C    correctly.
One way to partition a partially preordered set is with maximal antichains. S is a ≲ antichain iff every element of S is ≲ comparable to something, but no two elements of S are ≲ comparable to each other.
De nition . A set S is a
≲ antichain iff ∀x(x ∈ S → (∃y(x ≲ y ∨ y ≲ x) ∧ ¬∃z(z ∈ S ∧ x ≲ z ∨ z ≲ x))).
De nition . A ≲ antichain S is a maximal ≲ antichain iff no ≲ antichain properly includes S.
For example, the set of worlds in which John and Karen conceive a girl, in C   , is a maximal antichain of that preorder. By an adaptation of Kurepa's antichain principle⁷ to preorders, every preorder ≲ contains some maximal ≲ antichain:
Proposition . For any partially preordered set S, there is some maximal set of pairwise incomparable elements S
In other words, every partially preordered set S is a superset of a set of elements S ′ such that all the elements of S ′ are pairwise incomparable, and every element of S is comparable to some element of S ′ . It is via such sets S ′ -maximal antichains-that Kratzer's semantics partitions sets of worlds into 'upper' and 'lower' subsets. is is because PM is equivalent to
In English: 'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) iff there is some lower bound (construed as a maximal ≲ i antichain) on ≲ i such that every world at least as ≲ i good as that lower bound is a C-world. Proof.
⇒ Let T be the set of worlds such that t ∈ T iff ∀k(k
. en by the de nition of 'maximal antichain, ' there is some world, w, such that w ∈ S ≲i and w is not ≲ i comparable to any world in T.
But for every world h in S ≲i , some world in T is at least as ≲ i good as h,
, and any such j is a member of
⇐ Suppose for conditional proof that 'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to AM, so that there is some maximal ≲ antichain, B, such that
. By the de nition of 'maximal antichain, ' every world in S ≲i is ≲ i comparable to some world in B, since if a world in S ≲i were not ≲ i comparable to some world in B then B would not be a maximal ≲ i antichain. If a world in S ≲i is at least as ≲ i good as a world in B, then all the worlds at least as S ≲i good as it are C-worlds, by the construction of B and the transitivity of ≲ i . If a world in S ≲i is not at least as ≲ i good as any world in B, then there is some world that is ≲ i better than it in B; without loss of generality let that world be b. All the worlds at least as S ≲i good as b are C-worlds, by the construction of B. So whether or not a given world in S ≲i is at least as
A semantics that respects our intuitions about examples like C    must take into account every maximal chain of any given preorder. A natural way to do this is to move from thinking of the lower bounds on partial preorders as maximal antichains to thinking of lower bounds on partial preorders as cutsets, instead.
De nition .
A set S is a ≲ cutset iff S contains an element of each maximal ≲ chain.⁸ ⁸For early work on cutsets see B & G  (where, generalized to apply to graphs as well as to preorders, they are called "transversals") and G ; see also G . Some partially ordered sets lack minimal cutsets (H , L & R , and M ) so they are not good candidates to be lower bounds.  CM (C 'M'):
'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) iff there is some
In English (and deliberately paralleling my earlier gloss of AM): 'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) iff there is some lower bound (construed as a ≲ i cutset) on ≲ i such that every world at least as ≲ i good as that lower bound is a C-world. e preorder depicted in C    has many cutsets that are also maximal antichains. Here are three: . {the world in which exactly child  is conceived, the world in which exactly child  is conceived}; . {the world in which exactly child  is conceived, the world in which exactly children  and  are conceived, the world in which exactly children  and  are conceived};
. {the world in which exactly child  is conceived, the world in which exactly children  and  are conceived, the world in which exactly children , , and  are conceived, the world in which exactly children , , and  are conceived}.
ese sets are all cutsets because they intersect every maximal chain of the preorder. ey are all maximal antichains because none of their elements are comparable to each other, by the lights of the relevant preorder, and every other world ordered by that preorder is comparable to at least one of them. However, the maximal antichain consisting of worlds in which a girl is conceived-{the world in which exactly child  is conceived, the world in which exactly children  and  are conceived, the world in which exactly children , , and  are conceived, the world in which exactly children , , , and  are conceived, …}-is not a cutset, because it does not intersect every maximal chain of the preorder. In particular, it does not intersect the maximal chain {the world in which exactly child  is conceived, the world in which exactly children  and  are conceived, the world in which exactly children , , and  are conceived, the world in which exactly children , , , and  are conceived, …}. is is the heart of the difference between the AM/PM semantics for 'must' and the CM semantics. When some maximal antichain is 'better' than every cutset of a given preorder-in the sense that no world of the cutset is better than any world of the antichain, and some world of the antichain is better than some world of the cutset-the AM/PM semantics diverts its attention to that maximal antichain, treating it as a 'better' lower bound than any cutset lower bound. Applying CM to C    provides a helpful illustration. () is false according to CM because there is no cutset such that every world at least as good as it is a world in which a girl is conceived.
 ()
It must be that a girl is conceived.
() is false according to CM because there is no cutset such that every world at least as good as it is a world in which a girl is the last child conceived.
()
It must be that the last child conceived is a girl.
() is true according to CM (given, as before, that 'it must be that' and 'it is permissible that' are duals) because there is no cutset such that every world at least as good as it is a world in which a girl is conceived.
CM also rightly predicts that 'Must C ' is false at i in P . Indeed we lose nothing in the move from AM/PM to CM, for they agree in all cases but some with crucial features of C   . (I detail those cases in a moment.) To begin with, 'Must C ' is true according to CM only if it is true according to AM/PM.
Lemma . For each ≲ i cutset B there is some maximal ≲ i antichain A such that A ⊆ B.
Proof. Suppose for reductio that for some ≲ i cutset B there is no maximal ≲ i antichain A such that A ⊆ B. By Proposition  there is some maximal ≲ i antichain. Because (by the reductio assumption) no maximal ≲ i antichain is a subset of B, there is some element of S ≲i ∖ B that is not ≲ i comparable to any element of B; otherwise some subset of B would be a maximal ≲ i antichain. By Proposition  every element of S ≲i is an element of some maximal ≲ i chain, and so is comparable to every other element of that chain. So every element of S ≲i is ≲ i comparable to some element of B, because B contains an element of each maximal ≲ i chain. Contradiction. So for each ≲ i cutset B there is some maximal ≲ i antichain A such that A ⊆ B.
eorem . 'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to CM only if it is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to AM.
Proof. Suppose for conditional proof that 'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to CM, so that there is some
e cases in which 'Must C ' is true according to AM/PM and not true according to CM have exotic features that eorem , below, brings out.
Lemma . As before, let t ∈ T iff ∀k(k ≲ i t → k ∈ C). If 'Must C ' is not true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to CM, then some maximal ≲ i chain M is such that M ∩ T = ∅.
Proof. Suppose for reductio that 'Must C ' is not true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to CM (so that there is no ≲ i cutset, B, such that ∀h∀j((h ∈ B ∧ j ≲ i h) → j ∈ C)) and that every maximal ≲ i chain shares an element with T. By the assumption that 'Must C ' is not true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to CM there is no ≲ i cutset, B, such that B ⊆ T. But by the assumption that every maximal ≲ i chain shares an element with T, there is some ≲ i cutset that is a subset of T. Contradiction. So if 'Must C ' is not true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to CM, then some maximal ≲ i chain M is such that M ∩ T = ∅.
eorem . As before, let t ∈ T iff ∀k(k ≲ i t → k ∈ C). If 'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to AM and not according to CM, then there is some maximal ≲ i chain M and some maximal ≲ i antichain A such that A ⊆ T and every element of M is ≲ i bettered by some element of A.
Proof. Suppose that 'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to AM and not according to CM. By the supposition that 'Must C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to AM, there is some maximal ≲ i antichain A such that A ⊆ T. By the supposition that 'Must C ' is not true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to CM and Lemma  there is some maximal ≲ i chain M such that M ∩ T = ∅. Every element of M is ≲ i comparable to some element of A, because M ⊆ S ≲i and A is a maximal ≲ i antichain. Suppose that some element of M is at least as ≲ i good as some element of A. en that element of M is an element of T, by the supposition that ∀h∀j((h ∈ A ∧ j ≲ i h) → j ∈ C) and the transitivity of ≲ i . Contradiction. So every element of M is ≲ i bettered by some element of A.
So in any preorder that pulls the verdicts of AM/PM apart from those of CM, some maximal antichain beats every element of some maximal chain-as in C   . Obviously this requires that the beaten maximal chain improve without end; if it contains a world that is not bettered by any worlds in the maximal chain itself then it will be impossible for a maximal antichain to beat every one of its elements. e presence of such a maximal chain is not a sufficient condition for 'Must C ' to be true according to AM/PM and untrue according to CM, of course: we also need that the beaten maximal chain does not 'settle' on C-worlds. But if any C-world in the beaten maximal chain is bettered by a ¬C-world in the maximal chain, 'Must C ' will not be true according to CM. is is consistent with every world in some maximal antichain being such that any world at least as good as it is a C-world, making 'Must C ' true according to AM/PM. is is precisely what we see in C   .

To capture our intuitions about that kind of case we need to use cutsets, not maximal antichains, as lower bounds in ordering semantics.
. 'Ought'
e semantics for 'ought' on offer in  F  is couched in terms that are very different from those of ordering semantics:
Suppose that β is one of the possible alternatives we are considering. Let us say that the score of β is the class of imperatives in force that β ful lls. en: 'It ought to be that A' is true if and only if there is a possible [accessible] state of affairs β in A whose score is not included in the score of any γ in ¬A. (, slightly paraphrased) is can be seen as an early version of what came to be called premise semantics for modals, since it explicitly treats a modal as an expression that is sensitive to the relationship between the satisfaction of imperatives-which here play the role of 'premises'-and the content of its prejacent.⁹ One respect in which this semantics differs from Kratzer's ordering and premise semantics for 'must' is that van Fraassen's 'ought' does not validate agglomeration, and so allows for the consistency of moral dilemmas expressed with 'ought. ' at is, on both AM/PM and CM, if it must be that A and it must be that B, then it must be that A and B. But on van Fraassen's semantics for 'ought, ' the fact that it ought to be that A and it ought to be that B does not entail that it ought to be that A and B. So van Fraassen is in accord with E. J. Lemmon, who writes that …an explicit contradiction is derivable from the assumption that a man both must and must not do something. But no similar contradiction is derivable from the assumption that someone both ought and ought not to do something …. It seems to me that "ought" and "ought not" may well both be true, and that this description in fact characterizes a certain class of moral dilemma. …It is a nasty fact about human life the we sometimes both ought and ought not to do things; but it is not a logical contradiction. (, -) ⁹e canonical works of early premise semantics (V  and K  and ) do not appear to have been directly in uenced by this paper of van Fraassen's. For a prescient discussion of earlier work in a broadly similar vein, including C  and G , see L , -. Kratzer details her reasons for departing from the Chisholm/Goodman approach, and from Rescher's  approach, in her , -.
e invalidity of agglomeration is a desirable feature of van Fraassen's semantics for 'ought. ' Unfortunately his semantics makes counterintuitive predictions about C   , just as Kratzer's ordering semantics does. Suppose that the set of imperatives in force is It ought to be that the last child conceived is a girl.
() It ought to be that the last child conceived is a boy.
e intuitive prediction, I think, is that both these sentences are true. In short, by John and Karen's lights, it is not the case for any n that the conception of girl 2n − 1 has more deontic worth than the conception of boy 2n. But this is not consistent with rendering () true and () false. John and Karen have found themselves in a moral dilemma-really, in in nitely many moral dilemmas. It is impossible for all the in nitely many mutually inconsistent things that ought to be true to be true. Given the translation between ordering frames and premise sets described in L , ⁰ Kratzer's ordering semantics for 'is a good possibility' (, ) is equivalent to van Fraassen's semantics for 'ought' (and, incidentally, to TM, construed as a semantics not for 'must' but for 'ought'). All these semantics are equivalent to ⁰Jean-Paul Doignon and Jean-Claude Falmagne provide a rich set of related results in their  and . eir work was (and, unfortunately, remains) independent from work in ordering semantics and premise semantics per se.  OSO (O S 'O'):
'Ought C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) iff there is some world j such that j ≲ i i and every world k such that k ≲ i j is a C-world.
I suggest that we replace this semantics for 'ought' with MCO (M C 'O'): 'Ought C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) iff 'Must C ' is true at i relative to some maximal ≲ i chain.
() still comes out true on MCO: every maximal ≲ i chain that ends in a world in which the last child conceived is a girl is, on any plausible ordering semantics for 'must, ' a maximal ≲ i chain relative to which 'It must be that the last child conceived is a girl' is true. But now () comes out true as well, because 'It must be that the last child conceived is a boy' is true relative to the maximal ≲ i chain consisting of worlds in which only boys are conceived. e fundamental thought here is that weak necessity modals like 'ought' and 'should' abstract away from incomparability: 'Ought C ' is true iff there is some way of bracketing moral dilemmas on which 'Must C ' is true. More formally put, and within the framework of ordering semantics, weak necessity modals decompose partial preorders into their constituent maximal chains and test those maximal chains against the standards associated with strong necessity modals like 'must' and 'have to. ' is is certainly not the only difference between weak and strong necessity modals. But it is plausible that it is at least part of the explanation of why () and () are consistent even though () and () are inconsistent.
()
() It must be that the last child conceived is a boy.
Recent accounts of the distinction between weak and strong necessity modals-in particular, those advocated by K , S ,  F & I- , C ,  S et al. , and  F & I -wrongly render () and () every bit as inconsistent as () and (). is idea can also be easily expressed within the framework of premise semantics. A set of van Fraassen's scores-where, again, a score is just a set of imperatives-may be a ⊆ chain. A ⊆ chain of scores represents a direction of improvement; a maximal ⊆ chain of scores represents a maximally speci ed direction of improvement. e analogue of MCO in van Fraassen's terminology simply says that 'Ought C ' is true if Kratzer's semantics there is equivalent to the semantics van Fraassen considers and rejects in his , . and only if 'Must C ' is true relative to a maximal ⊆ chain of scores. More intuitively, 'Ought C ' is true if and only if 'Must C ' is true relative to some maximally speci ed direction of improvement. On the premise semantic way of thinking that Kratzer and Veltman develop, a modal is evaluated relative to a set of premises-the premise set. Call each consistent subset of a premise set P an argument associated with P. Expressed in these terms, MCO says that 'Ought C ' is true if and only if 'Must C ' is true relative to a maximal ⊆ chain of arguments. And on the original Kratzer/Veltman semantics-equivalent to PM-'Must C ' is true relative to a premise set P iff every argument A associated with P can be 'extended' to some argument B associated with P such that B establishes that C. (An argument B extends an argument A iff A ⊆ B.) Intuitively, 'Must C ' is true iff every relevant argument can be extended to a relevant argument that establishes that C. On the premise semantic analogue of CM, by contrast, 'Must C ' is true relative to a premise set P iff every maximal chain of relevant arguments contains an argument that establishes that C. Intuitively, the premise semantic analogue of CM asks whether every direction along which arguments constructed out of the premise set might be elaborated is a direction that establishes that C. 'Must C ' is true iff this condition is satis ed.
. Counterfactuals and deontic conditionals
We are now in a good position to assess the treatment of incomparability in David Lewis's work on counterfactuals. e Lewis Shell, as I call it here, is a characteristic feature of Lewisian theories of counterfactuals and deontic conditionals. It in effect asks us to evaluate 'A > C ' by ignoring ¬A-worlds (oen including i itself) and asking whether 'Must C ' is true at i. e antecedent restricts the preorder used to evaluate 'Must C ' to preorder only the A-worlds in S ≲i (cf. L , -; K , - and , -) . e assumption that A is a set of worlds allows for an elegant implementation.
De nition . A
2 (read 'the Cartesian square of A') = {⟨x, y⟩ ∶ x ∈ A ∧ y ∈ A} A partial preorder ≲ is just a relation, modeled by a set of ordered pairs. So by intersecting a preorder ≲ with another set of ordered pairs we can generate an order preserving subpreorder. In particular, intersecting ≲ i with A 2 yields a preorder over exactly the A-worlds preordered by ≲ i that agrees with ≲ i on the relations between them. To improve readability I abbreviate '≲ i ∩ A 2 ' with '≲ 

Obviously the Lewis Shell yields a semantics for 'A > C ' only once it is supplemented with a semantics for 'Must C. ' is makes it quite illuminating for present purposes. By factoring out the contribution the Lewis Shell makes to Lewis's  and  semantics, we can see the differences between those semantics as differences in the semantics of 'Must C. ' Here is Lewis's  semantics, and a reformulation that exposes the role of the Lewis Shell.
TC (T C/D C):
'A > C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) iff if there is an A-world in S ≲i , then there is some A-world j in S ≲i such that for all A-worlds k, if k ≲ i j then k is a C-world (, ).
eorem . 'A > C ' is true according to TC iff it is true according to TC
′ .
Proof.
⇒ Suppose 'A > C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to TC. e vacuous case is trivial. In the non-vacuous case there is some A-world j in S ≲i such that for all A-worlds k, if k ≲ i j then k is a C-world. 'A > C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to TC ′ because there is some world j
⇐ Suppose 'A > C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to TC ′ . e vacuous case is trivial. In the non-vacuous case, the truth of 'Must C ' according to TM entails that there is some world j in
Given the role that TM plays in TC ′ and eorem , it should not be surprising that TC makes bad predictions when asked to operate on partial preorders of worlds similar to those that were a problem for TM. For example:  P : e set of worlds
and w 2 is an (A ∧ ¬C)-world.
According to TC, 'A > C ' is true in i, thanks to w 1 . is prediction is wrong for a familiar reason: at some non-bettered A-world comparable to i-namely, w 2 -C is false. As Lewis puts it, TC "might misevaluate a counterfactual as false …because the worlds where the antecedent holds divide into incomparable classes" (, ). Lewis's  semantics avoids this result.
PC (P C/D C): 'A > C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) iff for every A-world h comparable to i, there is some A-world j such that (i) j ≲ i h and (ii) every A-world k such that k ≲ i j is also a C-world.
'A > C ' is false at i according to PC because w 2 (an A-world comparable to i) is such that the only A-world j such that j ≲ i w 2 is w 2 itself, but some A-world k such that k ≲ i j is not a C-world, since w 2 ≲ i w 2 , and w 2 is a ¬C-world. PC can be expressed using the Lewis Shell as follows:
eorem . 'A > C ' is true according to PC iff it is true according to PC ′ .
⇒ Suppose 'A > C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to PC. e vacuous case is trivial. In the non-vacuous case for every A-world h comparable to i, there is some A-world j such that (i) j ≲ i h and (ii) every A-world k such that k ≲ i j is also a C-world. 'A > C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) according to PC ⇐ Suppose 'A > C ' is true at i (relative to ≲) according to PC ′ . e vacuous case is trivial. In the non-vacuous case, the truth of 'Must C ' according to TM entails that for every world h comparable to i, there is some world j such that (i) j ≲ Unsurprisingly, PC and PM founder in similar ways on similar examples. It is harder to design preorders for counterfactuals than it is for deontic modals, because the preorders for counterfactuals must conform to weak centering (at least) and must respect our intuitions, such as they are, about minimal change. It may be that there are no reasonably natural sounding non-deontic counterfactuals the evaluation of which requires a structure like C   . For deontic conditionals, which Lewis discusses at length in chapter  of Counterfactuals, things are considerably easier. PC makes all of the following true, given a background of deontic value strictly increasing with proper supersets of children: () Given that nitely many boys and at most one girl are conceived, a girl must be conceived.
() Given that nitely many boys and at most one girl are conceived, with any girl conceived last, the last child conceived must be a girl.
() If it had to be that nitely many boys and at most one girl were conceived, then a girl would have to be conceived.
() If it had to be that nitely many boys and at most one girl were conceived, with any girl conceived last, the last child conceived would have to be a girl.
Replacing PM with CM in the Lewis Shell yields a semantics that is recognizably Lewisian, in a broad sense, and that makes the right predictions about ()-().
CC (C C/D C):
'A > C ' is true at i (relative to ≲ i ) iff there is some ≲ Just as CM strictly improves on PM, CC strictly improves on PC. A theorist who endorses PC (but restricts it to ordinary counterfactuals) and endorses CC (but restricts it to deontic conditionals) is in a pretty precarious position. Absent strong arguments to the contrary, endorsing CC for both ordinary counterfactuals and deontic conditionals seems the more sensible route.
